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ABSTRACT 
In his 1987 entry on ‘Perfect Competition’ in The New Palgrave, the 
author reviewed the question of the perfectness of perfect competition, and gave 
four alternative formalisations rooted in the so-called Arrow-Debreu-Mckenzie 
model. That entry is now updated for the second edition to include work done on 
the subject during the last twenty years. A fresh assessment of this literature is 
offered, one that emphasises the independence assumption whereby individual 
agents are not related except through the price system. And it highlights a 
‘linguistic turn’ whereby Hayek’s two fundamental papers on ‘division of 
knowledge’ are seen to have devastating consequences for this research 
programme. 
 
JEL classification:  D00 
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* 
An allocation of resources generated under perfect competition is an 
allocation of resources generated by the pursuit of individual self-interest and 
one which is insensitive to the actions of any single agent. Self-interest is 
formalised as the maximisation of profits over production sets by producers and 
the maximisation of preferences over budget sets by consumers, both sets of 
actions being taken at a price system which cannot be manipulated by any single 
agent, producer or consumer. An essential ingredient then in the concept of 
perfect competition, that which gives the adjective perfect its thrust, is the idea 
of economic negligibility and, in a set of traders with many equally powerful 
economic agents, the related notion of numerical negligibility. Perfect 
competition is thus an idealised construct akin (say) to the mechanical 
idealisation of a frictionless system or to the geometric idealisation of a straight 
line.  
Following the lead of Wald, a mathematical formalisation of perfect 
competition in a setting with an exogenously-given finite set of commodities 
and of agents was developed in the early fifties in the pioneering papers of 
Arrow, Debreu and McKenzie. It was shown that convexity and independence 
assumptions on tastes and technologies guarantee that a competitive equilibrium 
exists, and that a Pareto-optimal allocation can be sustained as a competitive 
equilibrium under appropriate redistribution of resources. It was also shown, 
drawing on the tacit assumption that markets are universal but by avoiding any 
convexity assumptions, that with local non-satiation, every competitive 
allocation is Pareto-optimal. Relegating precise definitions to the sequel, we 
refer the reader to Koopmans (1961) for a succinct statement of the theory; 
Debreu (1959) and McKenzie (2002) remain its standard references, Fenchel 
(1951) and Rockafellar (1960) its mathematical subtexts, and Weintraub (1985) 
and Ingrao-Israel (1987) its sources of historical appraisal.  
However, in its exclusive focus on drawing out the implications of 
convexity and agent-independence for a formalisation of perfect competition, 
the theory remained silent about environments with increasing marginal rates, in 
production and in consumption, as well as those where private and social costs 
and benefits do not coincide, to phrase this silence in Pigou’s (1932) vocabulary 
of a preceding period. In particular, the notion of perfect competition that was 
fashioned by the initial theoretical development had no room for economic 
phenomena emphasised, for example, in the papers of Hotelling (1938), Hicks 
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(1939) and Samuelson (1954). It took around two decades to show that at least 
as far as collective consumption and public goods were concerned, the theory 
had within it all the resources for an elegant incorporation, but of course within 
the confines and limitations of its purview; see Foley (1970) and his followers. 
Non-convexities in production and consumption were a different matter entirely; 
they required mathematical tools that went beyond convexity, and further 
development had to await the invention of non-smooth calculus of Clarke and 
his followers; see Rockafellar-Wets (1998) and Mordukhovich (2006) for a 
comprehensive treatment. 
 A robust formalisation of the idea of perfect competition for non-
convex technological environments in the specific form of marginal cost-
pricing equilibria, with the regulation of the increasing returns to scale 
producer(s) given an explicit emphasis, can be outlined under each of the three 
headings of the theory identified by Koopmans: existence and the two welfare 
theorems. Marginal cost pricing equilibria exist under suitable survival and 
loss assumptions, but are not globally Pareto optimal even under the 
assumption of universality of markets. Finally, Pareto optimal allocations can 
be sustained as marginal cost-pricing equilibria under appropriate 
redistribution of resources. Moreover, under the terminology of Lidahl-
Hotelling equilibria, Khan-Vohra (1987) provide the existence of an 
equilibrium concept that incorporates both public goods and increasing returns 
to scale in one sweep. This work on perfect competition in the presence of 
individualised prices stemming from collective consumption and a regulated 
production sector (or sectors) merits an entry in its own right, and rather than a 
detailed listing of the references, we refer the reader to Vohra (1992) and 
Mordukhovich (2006; Chapter 8) for details and references.  
Three observations in connection with this recent, but already substantial, 
literature are worth making. First, in the attempts to generalise the second 
theorem, one can discern a linguistic turn whereby both the Arrow-Debreu 
emphasis on decentralisation and the Hicks-Lange-Bergson-Samuelson-Allais 
equality of marginal rates are seen as special cases within a synthetic treatment 
emphasising the intersection of the cones formalising marginal rates; Khan’s 
(1988) introduction is a forceful articulation of this point of view. Second, a 
canonical formulation of the notion of marginal rates, despite fits and starts, now 
seems within reach, though a notion that works well for the necessary conditions 
may not be the one suited for the question of existence; see Hamano (1989) and 
Khan (1999). Finally, conceptual clarity requires an understanding of 
circumstances when this type of non-convex theory bears a strong imprint of its 
finite-dimensional, convex counterpart, as detailed in Khan (1993), and when its 
higher reaches require a functional-analytic direction totally different from that 
charted out in the pioneering papers of the fifties; see Bonnisseau-Cornet (2006) 
for references to recent work.  
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With price-taking assumed rather than proved, there is no over-riding 
reason why a formalisation of perfect competition must limit itself to a setting 
with a finite, as opposed to an infinite number of (perfectly-divisible) 
commodities. Indeed, another set of pioneering papers of Debreu, Hurwicz and 
Malinvaud, written in the fifties with an eye to a theory of intertemporal 
allocation but over a time horizon that is not itself arbitrarily given, fixed and 
finite so to speak, did consider the decentralisation of efficient production plans 
as profit maximising ones. But again, it was only two decades later that the work 
of Bewley, Peleg-Yaari, Gabszewicz and Mertens inaugurated sustained 
attempts to provide a general formalisation of perfect competition over infinite-
dimensional commodity spaces, see Khan-Yannelis (1991). The work can again 
be categorised under Koopmans’ three headings of the theory, but relative to its 
finite-dimensional counterpart, it emphasised that the separation of disjoint 
convex sets, and the use of aggregate resources to furnish a bound on the 
consumption sets to ensure compactness, prove to be matters of somewhat 
greater subtlety. In short, a compact set of an infinite-dimensional commodity 
space is “rather large” and its cone of non-negative elements “rather small”. 
Indeed, as Negishi’s method of proof attained dominance, the imbrication of the 
convexity assumption in a clear demarcation of fixed-point theorems for issues 
of existence and separating hyperplane theorems for those of decentralisation, 
no longer obtains. The subject is surveyed in Mas-Colell-Zame (1991), but 
another survey is perhaps overdue as exploration of individual mathematical 
structures, ordered structures in particular, reveal hitherto unforeseen essentials, 
and increasing returns to scale and other non-classical phenomena are inevitably 
accommodated; see the references of Aliprantis, et al. (2002, 2006), on the one 
hand, and those of Shannon (1999) and Bonnisseau (2002) on the other.  
However, the question persists as to what meaning can be given to the 
study of perfect competition in a setting with an exogenously-given infinite-
dimensional commodity space where markets open only once and there is no 
room for the correction of mistakes and unfulfilled plans? If the extension of the 
theory requires additional technical assumptions, how do they translate into 
desiderata that are of relevance for the formalisation of the coherence of 
decentralised, self-interested decision-making of independent agents acting 
independently of each other? Even if, for example, the uniform properness 
assumption of Mas-Colell (1986) and his followers could be pinned down as a 
formalisation of bounded marginal rates of substitution [see the notion of a 
Fatou cone in Araujo, et al. (2004) and one failed attempt in Khan-Peck (1989)], 
what does it say about the set-up of the model itself that lifts this up to be a 
limitation as fundamental as that of convexity or independence? If the 
underlying motivation for the extension to infinite-dimensional commodity 
spaces is time, risk, quality, information or location, how do these 
considerations manifest themselves in the infinite-dimensionality of the 
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commodity space, in a situation that necessities (or precludes) one commodity in 
an economy being numerically negligible relative to the entire set? More 
sharply, why the resulting problems ought not to be more squarely faced in 
simpler partial equilibrium models, rather than studied under the limitation of a 
construction whose primary emphasis is the viability and desirability of static 
interaction? We defer these issues to turn to our principal theme; namely, how to 
formalise the perfectness of perfect competition?  
The point is that the assumption of a finite number of agents embodied in 
all of this work is an explicit admission of the fact that the economic non-
negligibility of each agent, at least in principle, and therefore her non-
manipulation of, and corresponding submission to, the price-system furnishes a 
somewhat muted maximisation of her self-interest. In terms of the emphasis on 
negligibility as a pre-requisite for a rigorous formalisation of perfect 
competition, as is being emphasised in this entry, the postulated behaviour of 
individual agents in the so-called Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model of perfect 
competition, with or without infinite commodities, externalities and increasing 
returns to scale, leads to the rather natural puzzlement as to what is it precisely 
that guarantees an agent’s passive acceptance of the price system, leave alone 
individualised pricing rules, and that too in a construction whose primary 
motivation is consistency and generality. In the vernacular due to Hurwicz 
(1972), one that has gained increasing currency since the eighties, what is it that 
makes this model of the economic system incentive-compatible? how is its gloss 
of the intuitive notions of negligibility, large and many to be made precise? 
 Five conceptually separate attempts to answer this question are 
distinguished here; these alternative but inter-related formalisations of perfect 
competition draw their meaning from two early conjectures: (i) Edgeworth’s 
(1881) conjecture on the shrinking of the core to its set of competitive 
allocations (again, precise definitions to follow), and (ii) Farrell’s (1959) 
conjecture on the existence of competitive equilibrium in a environment that is 
not necessarily convex. Interpreted literally, both conjectures are clearly false 
for a given finite economy, but the first can be distinguished from the second in 
not being simply a case of dispensing with an assumption in a result whose basic 
contours are wellestablished, but rather in going beyond Koopmans’ 
categorisation of perfect competition to include a solution concept other than 
that of Pareto optimality. It is in the reliance of the core notion as a test for the 
perfectness of competition, in working with a third fundamental theorem of 
welfare economics, so to speak, and in giving precision to the ambiguity 
inherent in the term shrinking, that allows an entry into the formalisation of the 
negligibility of individual agents. However, at this point, the discussion 
demands the rigor of notation and definitions; and since the essence of the ideas 
can be adequately communicated in the context of an economy without 
producers, that is, in an exchange economy, we confine ourselves to this case. 
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An exchange economy consists of a commodity space L, a set of traders 
T, a space of trader characteristics ρ defined on the commodity space, and a 
mapping ε from T into ρ with the triple ε(t) ≡ (X(t), ≥ t, e(t)) specifying the 
characteristics of agent t in T. The space of characteristics is thus a product 
space constituted by consumption sets X(t) ⊆ L, by binary relations ≥t over 
X(t)×X(t), preferences over the consumption set read “preferred or indifferent 
to”, and by initial endowments e(t)∈X(t). An allocation x : T → L is an 
assignment of commodity bundles such that x(t) ∈X(t) for all t in T and such that 
the summation, suitably formalised, of (x(t) – e(t)) over T is zero, or, in the case 
of free-disposal, less than or equal to zero. In any case, the fundamental 
economic problem facing a particular exchange economy, as discussed above 
and being given symbolic formulation here, is the choice of an allocation. 
An allocation x : T → L is said to be in the core if there does not exist any 
other allocation y and a coalition S ⊆ T, suitably formalised, such that y(t) ≥t x(t) 
and not x(t) ≥ y(t) for all t ∈ S, and that the summation of (y(t) – e(t)) over S is 
zero, or again with free disposal, less than or equal to zero. A perfectly 
competitive allocation of resources is a price-based allocation where a price 
system is a non-zero, continuous linear function on the commodity space L. A 
competitive equilibrium is a pair (p, x) where p is a price system and x an 
allocation such that for all t in T, x(t) is a maximal element for ≥t in the budget 
set {y ∈ X(t)) : (y, p) ≤ (e(t), p)}. Here (y, p) denotes the valuation of the 
commodity bundle y by the function p and, in case L is the Euclidean space 
,lIR  the Reisz representation theorem allows it to be given a simple accounting 
interpretation of an inner product (y, p) = ∑ =li 1piyi; see Rudin (1974) for this 
theorem and, if unspecified, for other terminology. For any competitive 
equilibrium (p, x), x will be referred to as a competitive allocation. In terms of 
the earlier discussion of infinite-dimensional commodity spaces, the commodity 
space L has presumed on it enough mathematical structure so as to give meaning 
to the ordering “less than or equal to”, to the summation operator in the notion 
of an allocation and of a blocking coalition, and to linearity and continuity in the 
notion of a price-system. Conceptually, what is of consequence here is that 
competitive allocations can be viewed as making precise the idea of some sort of 
individual rationality, and core allocations as making precise the idea of some 
sort of group rationality.  
In Aumann’s (1964) formulation of perfect competition, the set of traders 
is the Lebesgue unit interval, the commodity space is the Euclidean non-
negative orthant ,l+IR  the set of admissible coalitions the Borel σ-algebra on the 
unit interval, and summation, Lebesgue integration. Under the assumption of 
Lebesgue measurability of preferences ≥, and of Lebesgue integrability of the 
initial endowments e(·), he proved that the set of competitive allocations of such 
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an economy coincides with its set of core allocations and, in Aumann (1966), 
that neither set is empty. These precise and elegant affirmations of the 
conjectures of Edgeworth and Farell did not require any convexity hypotheses 
on preferences, and what is perhaps of equal significance, they furnished a 
precise formulation of an idealised limit economy in which price-taking is 
rendered theoretically reputable: every agent is numerically and economically 
negligible in that his or her effect, not only on the price system, but also on the 
equilibrium allocation, is precisely zero. An agent has a negligible weight very 
much akin (say) to the probability of a particular point on a dart-board being hit 
by a dart. 
The seminal nature of Aumann’s conception was quickly realised and 
incorporated into the mainstream: the metaphor of a continuum of agents is 
appealed to validate aggregation in a removal of idiosyncratic uncertainty even 
in models of a representative agent in theoretical work in macroeconomics and 
other, so-called applied, fields, work that is nothing if not an investigation of 
competition, perfect or otherwise. Two observations are worth making. First, 
whereas Aumann’s assumption of a Lebesgue unit interval was only a 
simplifying one, and that the results hold for any arbitrary atomless and finite 
measure space, Lebesgue (rather than Riemann-Stieltjes) integration is essential 
to a theory based on T as the set of agent-names, and therefore free of any 
topological considerations; see Khan-Sun (2002; Introduction) for a detailed 
exposition of this point. Indeed, Shapley has even questioned the postulate of 
measurability, leave alone continuity, for a notion of an allocation whose very 
raison d’etre is a formalisation of independent individual self-interest. Second, 
since the theory is based on a neglect of sets of measure zero, it is the 
conception of an allocation as an equivalence classes of functions, rather than of 
functions themselves, that is identified by the theory. Put more sharply, Pareto-
optimal allocations in an economy with a continuum of agents do not exist if 
their definition is taken verbatim from that of a finite economy, and not recast in 
terms of coalition of positive measure. In any case, the theory of an economy ε 
conceived as a measurable map, at least in its finite-dimensional embodiment, is 
a testimony to the power of Lyapunov theorem on the range of an atomless 
vector measure and to a powerful mathematical theory of the integration of 
correspondences that emerges as its corollary; Hildenbrand (1974) is the 
relevant reference.  
A contemporaneous formulation of Vind (1964) short-circuits some of 
these issues concerning sets of zero measure by ignoring agents altogether, and 
focussing instead on coalitions, each with their own preferences and 
endowments, as the primitive data of the economy. Allocations then are 
measures on a non-atomic measure-space, and the notions of core and 
competitive allocations, correspondingly defined, can be shown to be identical 
solution concepts. This is a formulation of perfect competition that is also 
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measure-theoretic, but one, alternative to that of Aumann, that explicitly does 
away with mathematical integration as its necessary micro-foundation. 
However, by assuming countable additivity, Vind enabled Debreu (1967) to 
draw on Radon-Nikodym differentiation to effect a reconciliation. It took 
subsequent work of Armstrong and Richter to give fuller autonomy to this 
alternative point of view by first eliminating countable additivity, and then in 
setting the discussion in the framework of non-atomic Boolean algebras; see 
Armstrong-Richter (1986) and their references. Whereas the technical 
underpinning of this approach is now clearly seen to be the Armstrong-Prikry 
extension of the Lyapunov theorem, it is perhaps fair to say that the conceptual 
ramifications of this alternative (perhaps syndicalist) vision have yet to be fully 
explored and understood; see Avallone-Basile (1998) and Basile-Graziano 
(2001) for references to current research.  
The Brown-Robinson (1975) formulation of perfect competition, the 
third to be discussed here, returns to the methodological individualism of 
Aumann, and requires the set of agent-names T to be an internal star-finite 
set, the commodity space to be * ,l+IR  the nonstandard extension of l+IR  
based on manipulable infinitely large and infinitesimally small numbers, the 
summation in the definitions of allocations and core to be summation over 
internal sets, the set of admissible coalitions to be the set of all internal 
subsets of T and ε to be an internal map from T to *ρ, the set of agent 
characteristics modelled on * .l+IR  Such a formulation utilises methods of 
nonstandard analysis, a specialisation in mathematical logic due to A. 
Robinson; see Loeb-Wolff (2000) for details and references. On replacing 
equality by equality modulo infinitesimals in the definitions of allocation 
and the core, Brown-Robinson (1975), and without their ad-hoc standardly 
bounded assumption on allocations, Brown-Khan (1980), showed the 
equivalence (and Brown (1976) the existence) of core and competitive 
allocations of a non-standard economy without any convexity assumptions 
on preferences. Loeb’s (1963) combinatorial analogue of Lyapunov’s 
theorem provided the mathematical underpinning of the theory. This 
alternative affirmation of the conjectures of Edgeworth and Farell is another 
way of making precise the concepts of many agents and of their individual 
negligibility: meaning can be given to an individual trader’s actions having a 
positive, but infinitesimal, effect on the price system and on an allocation. 
Even though an initial motivation of this work was to explore a formulation 
of perfect competition and of a large economy in a vernacular alternative to 
that of measure theory, it was heavily influenced by measure-theoretic 
formulations, but with an added emphasis on asymptotic implementation, 
something clear even in the earliest papers of Brown-Robinson and Khan; 
see Rashid (1987) and Anderson (1991) for details and references.  
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Strange as it may seem in retrospect, the idealisations of Aumann and 
Brown-Robinson were criticised on grounds of realism, on the observation that 
there do not exist economies with uncountably many agents; see Koopmans 
(1974) and the Georgescu-Roegen-Rashid exchange discussed in Khan (1998). 
The work categorised here as a fourth formalisation of perfect competition was 
motivated, in part, by this criticism (ironically also used by Armstrong-Richter 
as their stated motivation for finitely-additive measures), and, in part, by a 
methodological curiosity as to whether the results established for non-standard 
and measure-theoretic economies are artifacts of the way negligibility and large 
economies were being modelled. Taking its point of departure from the 
replicated sequences of Debreu-Scarf (1963), the response is to consider a 
sequence G { }∞=ε= 1kk of finite economies based on the commodity space ,l+IR  
where εk is an economy with a set of agents Tk of cardinality k. For each finite 
economy εk, competitive and core allocations can be defined in the conventional 
way without encountering any technical difficulties in the formalisation of 
summation or of a coalition. It is clear that agents in εk get increasingly 
numerically negligible with an increase in k, and given a uniformly bounded 
assumption on initial endowments, also get increasingly economically 
negligible. For this perfectly competitive sequence of economies, one can ask: 
for any “ > 0, however small, does there exist an integer ko such that core 
allocations of all εk ∈ G, k ≥ ko, can be sustained as approximate competitive 
equilibria, and whether such equilibria exist, with” indicating in either instance, 
the degree of approximation? In short, are the formulations of perfect 
competition in idealised limit economies capable of an asymptotic 
implementation, with an arbitrarily fine degree of approximation, in economies 
of arbitrarily large but finite cardinality?  
Asymptotic equivalence and existence theorems under varying degrees of 
generality followed quickly once the problem was posed. We shall not touch 
upon the various elaborations and refinements except to note that they have been 
obtained under two disparate techniques, both drawing on the results for an 
idealised limit economy. The first approach, associated especially with 
Hildenbrand, is to conceive of an economy as a measure on the space of 
characteristics and to utilise Skorokhod’s theorem and the theory of weak 
convergence of measures on a topological space (typically metrisable) of 
characteristics ρ. Under Debreu’s rather vivid terminology of “neighbouring 
economic agents”, such topologies were formulated by Debreu, Kannai, 
Hildenbrand-Mertens, Grodal and others, and surely have independent interest; 
see Hildenbrand (1974). The second approach is based on the observation that 
“any sentence which is true in the standard universe is true for internal entities in 
the non-standard universe”, and as such results pertaining to a non-standard 
exchange economy ‘flipped over’, as it were, to a corresponding result for a 
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large but finite economy. The differences between the two approaches are 
interesting from a methodological point of view: the fact that one approach is, in 
principle, not inherently dependent on any topology on the space of preference 
relations or on their continuity [as in Khan-Rashid (1976, 1982)] and applies as 
readily to core as to competitive allocations [as in Khan (1974)], suggests a 
further look as to how the other may be extended; see Anderson (1992) for a 
comprehensive treatment. In any case, we have two mutually supporting ways of 
extracting information for large but finite economies from idealised limit 
economies, even of the mixed type with atoms that generated the skepticism in 
the first place; [see Gabszewicz-Shitovitz (1992) and their references. This 
claim is further underscored by a development due to Loeb (1975)], but before 
turning to it, we discuss what may be seen as fifth and final formulation of 
negligibility and thereby of perfect competition.  
The asymptotic interpretation of the perfectness of perfect competition 
concerns sequences of economies, and a question arises as to whether, given an 
arbitrary economy rather than an arbitrary degree of approximation, one can find 
the error, independent of the number of agents, with which the equivalence and 
existence theorems hold? Thus, rather than ask how large is large enough, one 
asks how small is small for the assumption of price-taking behaviour to be 
unjustified. For the question posed in this way, initially by Starr (1969), it was 
the definitive result of Anderson (1978) that capped initial explorations of 
Arrow-Hahn, Henry, Shaked and others. With the shedding of compactness and 
continuity assumptions under the nonstandard approach, Anderson observed that 
the argument in Khan-Rashid (1976) could be based on the Shapley-Folkman 
theorem instead of that of Loeb (1973) (itself based on Steinitz’ theorem), and 
carried out entirely in standard terms to obtain an elementary equivalence 
theorem. This yields the asymptotic results as corollaries, and they also come 
equipped with a rate of convergence, a consideration emphasised by Shapley 
(1975). The same observation applied to Khan-Rashid (1982) led to an 
elementary existence theorem; [see Geller’s (1986) extension of Anderson-
Khan-Rashid (1982)].  
In the prominence that it gives to a fixed finite economy, this fifth 
formulation of perfect competition connects directly to the results whose 
introduction began this entry; it emphasises that the equalities in the results 
surveyed by Koopmans, and the counterexamples implicitly underlying them, 
perhaps ought not be taken completely literally, but rather given a probabilistic 
cast. In his alternative proof of the Shapley-Folkman theorem, Cassels (1975) 
had already emphasised this connection, and Mas-Colell deepened it further by 
appealing to results of especial sophistication concerning the law of large 
numbers and the central limit theorem. He noted that his refinement of the 
equivalence theorem has “no analogue in Aumann’s continuum of traders 
model”, and that the precise probabilistic estimates that this approach offers 
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have no counterpart in the continuum framework; see Anderson (1992; Sections 
8 and 9). However, it is undeniable that it is the exact results for the idealised 
limit economies that generally indicate the directions of pursuit of the 
approximations for a finite economy: approximations and numerical algorithms 
come into play once the exact has been exactly identified. Thus, from a 
substantive point of view, modulo fine technicalities, how a particular issue 
pertaining to perfect competition is set, measure-theoretic or non-standard or 
asymptotic, is largely a contextual matter of analytical convenience and 
preference.  
This conclusion is further sharpened by the methodological unification 
offered in Loeb (1975); see Khan-Sun (1997b) for exposition. It is the central 
claim of this entry that Loeb probability spaces go a long way towards settling 
the question of how the perfectness of perfect competition is to be given a 
precise mathematical formulation. It is already clear in Aumann’s pioneering 
papers that perfect competition draws from the atomlessness rather than any 
other particularities of the measure space of agents: the metric on the unit 
interval, or the topology of any topological measure space, is not, indeed cannot 
be, of any direct relevance. What is presumably of the essence is that the space 
of agents’ names be hospitable to measurability as well as to independence (the 
latter term now being used in its precise probabilistic sense rather than as a 
reference to an absence of externalities), that it generate results capable of 
straightforward asymptotic implementation, and that, for concepts that revolve 
only on distributions of the allocations as in Hart-Kohlberg, it yields solutions 
that are insensitive to a permutation of agent names. In the context of large 
games (discussed below), Khan-Sun (1996, 1999) make the case for Loeb 
spaces on the basis of these desiderata and emphasise their dual identity in the 
“pushing down” and “lifting up” theorems: being standard, measure spaces, any 
result on an abstract measure-space (Aumann) economy applies to them, and 
thereby, to an internal non-standard (Brown-Robinson) economy and hence can 
be asymptotically interpreted; or alternatively, any approximate result can be 
translated, as indicated above, to a non-standard economy, and thereby pushed 
down to its standard Loeb measure-theoretic counterpart. As such, Loeb spaces 
go a considerable way in obliterating the five-fold categorisation of perfect 
competition that marks this entry.  
Going beyond method to mathematical substance, atomless Loeb spaces 
are ideally suited for operations ensuring that aggregation removes the 
irregularities that arise from non-convexities as well as from idiosyncratic 
uncertainty. In a systematic and far-reaching development, Sun established that 
the integrals and distributions of correspondences defined on Loeb spaces and 
taking values in a separable infinite-dimensional Banach space, in the first 
instance, and into Polish spaces (separable and completely metrisable) in the 
second, have all the properties that the theory of perfect competition requires of 
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them. Moreover, a perfectly satisfactory law of large numbers for a continuum 
of random variables is obtained, and for a such a set, that the notions of 
independence and of exchangeability are dual in a very elegant sense, and that it 
yields, as in Duffie-Sun (2006), the existence of an independent random 
matching. Supplementing the notion of an economy as a random variable, the 
measurability of the map ε noted above, a stochastic economy can now be 
formalised as a stochastic process on a product space, the space of agent-names 
T and an atomless Loeb space of states of nature, Ω, to reveal circumstances 
under which the distributions of core and competitive allocations of a sampled 
economy coincide, or approximately coincide in the case of a large economy, 
with those of the deterministic (population) economy; see Sun (1999). Further 
application of this substantial theory is noted below; here  the reader is referred 
to Sun’s chapters in Loeb-Wolff (2000; Chapters 7 and 8) for exposition and full 
mathematical references.  
In taking stock at this stage, we underscore the fact that even though five 
robust and logically related methods of studying perfect competition have been 
illustrated through the conjectures of Edgeworth and Farrell, the discussion 
could, in principle, equally well have been conducted through alternative tests 
based on alternative solution concepts: the value [Hart (2002) and his 
references], or the bargaining set [Anderson (1998)] and his references), or 
Cournot’s conjecture [Mas-Colell (1983), Novshek-Sonnenschein (1983) and 
their references], all now conceived in a setting where individual agents are 
negligible. Alternatively, we could discuss applications, particularly in 
mathematical finance where Arrow markets and ideas of negligibility find 
concrete expression in derivative financial instruments and in well-diversified 
portfolios [see Anderson-Raimondo (2006) and Khan-Sun (1997a) respectively 
for references]. However, rather than turn to them and make this entry 
unmanageable, we draw on the rich and diverse formulation of perfect 
competition at our disposal to consider the substantive issues broached earlier: 
public goods, externalities, increasing returns to scale and infinite commodities, 
all under the rubric of static interaction. Ironically, non-convexities in idealised 
limit economies have concerned consumptions sets and survival assumptions 
rather than increasing returns to scale technologies [see Trockel (1984), 
Hammond (1993) and their references]; research efforts have been most active 
in the study of public goods and externalities, and here the theory dovetails, 
from a technical point of view, into work on infinite-dimensional commodity 
spaces.  
The formalisation and defense of perfect competition has, from the very 
earliest, proceeded on the independence assumption: the fact that individual 
agents are not related other than through the price system. Thus Hayek (1948; 
pp. 96-97) quotes Stigler in emphasising the “explicit and complete exclusion 
from the theory ... of all personal relationships existing between the parties.” 
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Such relationships are external to the perfected concept, and to the extent that 
positive and normative content can be cleanly distinguished, externalities and 
the Pigovian private/social divergences that they entail, have strong and negative 
implications for its normative content. If the non-convexities identified by 
Starrett (1972) are ignored [but also see Otani-Sicilian (1977)], Arrow’s 
universality requirement for the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics 
can always be met by the creation of markets, fictitious or otherwise, but it leans 
on a particularly acute form of myopia. Arrow securities and Lindahl prices for 
public goods, and more generally, prices for contingent commodities and 
personalised prices for more pervasive externalities bring out an obvious tension 
between incentive compatibility and efficiency. As brought out in Starrett 
(1971), if there is a commodity that reflects a particular agent’s dependence on 
my consumption, why should she or I, leave alone the others, take the price of 
that commodity to be given and non-manipulable? take myself to be 
economically negligible?  
There is also a technical problem in the consideration of pervasive 
externalities in an idealised limit economy. Since the individualistic, as 
opposed to the coalitionally-based, approach to perfect competition works 
with an equivalence class of functions from the space of agent-names to agent-
actions rather than the function itself, it is difficult to give meaning to one 
agent’s dependence on the actions of another. In a context of a Lindahl 
equilibrium of an idealised limit economy, even one with a finite number of 
commodities and a single public good, one has to reckon with the fact that 
public goods enjoin equality instead of aggregation, and thereby force the 
analysis out of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space, as in the Aumann-
Brown-Robinson limit theory, to a search for a suitably tractable space of 
equivalence classes of functions of individualised prices. It is these attendant 
functional-analytic difficulties, perhaps as much as the fact that the incentive-
compatibility problems are most acute in this setting, that has discouraged the 
initial exploratory attempts of Roberts, Emmons and Khan-Vohra from being 
followed up; see Khan-Vohra (1985) for references. And it is precisely 
difficulties of this kind that also prevent a successful theory for idealised limit 
economies with non-ordered preferences; see Balder’s (2000) use of the 
argument in Khan-Papageorgiou (1985), originally due to Grodal, to turn a 
positive proof into a negative claim of inconsistency, a claim that derails the 
initial exploration of Khan-Vohra (1984) and their followers. Externalities, 
rather than being widespread, need to be controlled and confined in an 
idealised limit economy. The theory is under active development, and it is too 
early to say that a formulation sufficiently robust as to be deemed canonical 
has been achieved; see Balder (2004, 2005), Balder, et al. (2006), Cornet-
Topuzo (2005), Hammond (1995), Kaneko-Wooders (1994), Noguchi (2005), 
Noguchi-Zame (2006) and their references.  
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In its dissociation of the study of perfect competition from its roots in 
welfare theory, this work makes explicit its connection to game theory. 
Competitive equilibria with externalities take their place next to marginal-cost 
pricing and Cournot-Nash equilibria in violating Pareto optimality, but does 
allow one to ask whether decentralised self-interested decision-making is 
consistent in the aggregate if it is taken with respect to certain measurable 
indecis of societal responses rather than solely with respect to a price system. 
Such a formulation of perfect competition goes back to the early fifties in the 
papers of McKenzie and Debreu, and to the seventies in Chipman’s formulations 
of Marshallian parametric externalities. Indeed, Arrow-Debreu’s original proof 
of the existence of competitive equilibrium revolved around viewing the 
economy as a game in which the only “personal relationship” between the 
parties relates to that with a fictitious auctioneer, a point of view that finds fuller 
expression in the Shafer-Sonnenschein notion of an abstract economy. In more 
recent investigations of a large game, the literature takes another turn towards 
probability theory, and conceives of an agent’s actions as resulting from 
maximisation but one that takes as given the distribution, or individual 
moments, of the random variable summarising societal responses. The question 
then reduces to the existence of such equilibrium distributions, but with social 
interaction, however limited, recourse has to be made to assumptions on ideal 
types, and on the conditional or mutual independence of these types; see 
Hayek’s (1948; p. 47) prescient remarks. This is a theory of competition in 
which Loeb spaces, and the Dvoretsky-Wald-Wolfowitz extension of the 
Lyapunov theorem play a dominant role; see Khan-Sun (1999, 2002), Khan-
Rath-Sun (2006), Loeb-Sun (2006) and their references to the work of 
Schmeidler, Radner-Rosenthal, Milgrom-Weber and Mas-Colell.  
The technical machinery forged through the study of large games enables 
a broadened notion of economic negligibility, one that includes informational 
negligibility in an environment with asymmetric information. In a 1936 article 
on “economics and knowledge,” Hayek (1948; pp. 43-44) had already 
supplemented Adam Smith’s emphasis on the division of labour by the principle 
of the division of knowledge and asked “whether, in order that we can speak of 
equilibrium, every single individual must be right, or whether it would not be 
sufficient if, in consequence of a compensation of errors in different directions, 
quantities of the different commodities coming on the market were the same as 
if every individual had been right. A fuller discussion of this problem would 
have to consider the whole question of the significance which some economists 
(including Pareto) attach to the law of great numbers in this connection”. The 
issue is “right” about what? The problem devolves on anticipations and 
expectations, beliefs about beliefs regarding each other and the price system, 
and it does not require more than a mild degree of scepticism to abandon 
fictional markets responding to predetermined and universally agreed-upon 
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states of nature. There is need for viable notions of independence and 
aggregation to eliminate idiosyncratic risk and nullify “combination of 
fragments of knowledge existing in different minds”. Sun (2006) and Sun-
Yannelis (2006a, 2006b) give pride of place to the Fubini property in idealised 
limit economies, and consolidate earlier applications of Loeb spaces for a 
successful resolution of Malinvaud’s work on insurance markets, and that of 
Gul, McLean and Postlewaite on the compatibility of efficiency and incentive 
compatibility; also see Jackson-Manelli (1997). Sun also presents compelling 
arguments why finitely additive measures and the conventional product measure 
cannot respond to the technical difficulties.  
The problems arising from asymmetric information are, at their root, 
problems of agent interdependence that cannot be internalised through markets, 
and as such, represent particularly recalcitrant externalities; the assumptions that 
Sun-Yannelis impose on their signal process can be seen as one successful 
attempt to subdue them. And in an idealised limit economy with many 
commodities, seen on its own rather than through the externalities’ lens, one has 
to cope with the fact that Lyapunov’s theorem is false for an infinite-
dimensional vector measure, in addition to all of the problems discussed earlier. 
It is the thinness of its target space, as proposed by Kingman-Robertson in the 
late sixties, that allows an atomless probability space of agents to work its magic 
in the form of the existence and equivalence theorems; see Kluvanek-Knowles 
(1976) and Diestel-Uhl (1977) for necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
validity of the Lyapunov theorem. There is a hidden assumption, to adopt the 
postmodern flourish of Tourky-Yannelis (2001), in the Aumann-Brown-
Robinson formulations of perfect competition, and the equivalence theorem can 
fail when the qualitative relationship between the cardinalities of agents and 
commodities fails; in addition to Muench’s example, see Forges, et al. (2001) 
and Serrano, et al. (2002). More generally, if the intricacies of reaching binding 
agreements in coalition-formation cannot be bracketed away, how can a concept 
embodying group rationality coincide with one hinging on individual 
rationality? An option, but one that goes against the very grain of this entry, is to 
dissociate competition from price-taking entirely and derive it as a consequence, 
as in the no-surplus characterisations of Makowski-Ostroy (2001; Section 9) and 
Serrano-Volij (2000). The field is under active development; in addition to the 
papers of Sun, Tourky and Yannelis, see Forges, et al. (2002), Herves-Beloso, et 
al. (2005), Martins-da-Rocha (2003, 2004), Podczek (1997, 2003) and their 
references.  
In his classic 1936 tour de force, Hayek deconstructed the Arrow-Debreu-
McKenzie construction before it was constructed, so to speak, by distinguishing 
between an a priori “pure logic of choice” and an empirical science. In so far as 
this entry, in its focus on existence and core-equivalence, has concentrated on 
the adjective perfect, and avoided questions of cardinality, computability, 
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learning and stability of a perfectly  allocation of resources, it has neglected the 
noun competition as being outside its scope. For this, the reader could perhaps 
begin with Morgan (1993), and move from there to Arrow (1986), Buchanan 
(1987) and Radner (1991), and from there, if she is still so inclined, to the entire 
gamut of economic theory.  
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